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	<title>Comments on: Eureka!</title>
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		<title>By: Carl</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1342</link>
		<dc:creator>Carl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2009 21:41:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1342</guid>
		<description>No you&#039;re right, Dave, he was actively opposed to scholars as such entering broader conflicts (dissemination of findings was fine and he did loads of that), because in doing so they had to become partisans for values that come prior to conventional methodological consensus, and in doing so threatened the general value of their scholarly output. If you don&#039;t value knowledge that&#039;s demonstrably reliable on non-dogmatic grounds then I suppose he would say good luck with that.

It&#039;s worth remembering, though, that his own career included both scholarship and political work. He just didn&#039;t think you could do both at once, because politics skew scholarship. Nowadays a lot of people would agree on the grounds that there are always politics, so scholarship is always skewed. Philosophically this is a more wittgensteiny position. I think Weber&#039;s response would be something like, of course that&#039;s the case, which is why scholars need a rigorous ethic and robust peer networks. There are no guarantees, but there&#039;s also in principle no reason we can&#039;t do &#039;better&#039; with that rather than &#039;worse&#039;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No you&#8217;re right, Dave, he was actively opposed to scholars as such entering broader conflicts (dissemination of findings was fine and he did loads of that), because in doing so they had to become partisans for values that come prior to conventional methodological consensus, and in doing so threatened the general value of their scholarly output. If you don&#8217;t value knowledge that&#8217;s demonstrably reliable on non-dogmatic grounds then I suppose he would say good luck with that.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s worth remembering, though, that his own career included both scholarship and political work. He just didn&#8217;t think you could do both at once, because politics skew scholarship. Nowadays a lot of people would agree on the grounds that there are always politics, so scholarship is always skewed. Philosophically this is a more wittgensteiny position. I think Weber&#8217;s response would be something like, of course that&#8217;s the case, which is why scholars need a rigorous ethic and robust peer networks. There are no guarantees, but there&#8217;s also in principle no reason we can&#8217;t do &#8216;better&#8217; with that rather than &#8216;worse&#8217;.</p>
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		<title>By: Dave Mazella</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1340</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave Mazella</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2009 18:55:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1340</guid>
		<description>Carl, I like the idea of &quot;pragmatic negotiation&quot; as a form of communication, but I&#039;m curious about which works of Weber&#039;s you&#039;d cite for this: e.g., &quot;Science as a Vocation&quot;?  The caveat that I would add is that though Weber is highly conscious of the scholarly duty to maintain the standards that allow scholars to communicate with one another, I&#039;m not sure he&#039;s committed to any wider dissemination of one&#039;s findings, or entry of scholars into broader conflicts, e.g., &quot;Politics as a Vocation.&quot;  I completely agree about his commitment to some form of scholarly neo-stoicism, though.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl, I like the idea of &#8220;pragmatic negotiation&#8221; as a form of communication, but I&#8217;m curious about which works of Weber&#8217;s you&#8217;d cite for this: e.g., &#8220;Science as a Vocation&#8221;?  The caveat that I would add is that though Weber is highly conscious of the scholarly duty to maintain the standards that allow scholars to communicate with one another, I&#8217;m not sure he&#8217;s committed to any wider dissemination of one&#8217;s findings, or entry of scholars into broader conflicts, e.g., &#8220;Politics as a Vocation.&#8221;  I completely agree about his commitment to some form of scholarly neo-stoicism, though.</p>
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		<title>By: John McCreery</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1339</link>
		<dc:creator>John McCreery</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2009 06:38:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1339</guid>
		<description>Narya, what do you mean by &quot;cling to Objectivity&quot;? And why is this a failure?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Narya, what do you mean by &#8220;cling to Objectivity&#8221;? And why is this a failure?</p>
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		<title>By: Carl</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1338</link>
		<dc:creator>Carl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2009 20:21:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1338</guid>
		<description>Narya, I think Weber&#039;s gotten a bum rap on that, as has Durkheim. We keep back-reading them through the lens of positivism, but they were much more a part of the overcoming of it. Both had strong roots in Kant so knew better than to have any sort of strong Objectivity programme to start with. The question for them is not how to get Truth, but how to construct reliable knowledge. That&#039;s still the question... anyway, totally agree that Wittgenstein is the welcome omega for positivism.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Narya, I think Weber&#8217;s gotten a bum rap on that, as has Durkheim. We keep back-reading them through the lens of positivism, but they were much more a part of the overcoming of it. Both had strong roots in Kant so knew better than to have any sort of strong Objectivity programme to start with. The question for them is not how to get Truth, but how to construct reliable knowledge. That&#8217;s still the question&#8230; anyway, totally agree that Wittgenstein is the welcome omega for positivism.</p>
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		<title>By: Narya</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1337</link>
		<dc:creator>Narya</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2009 19:21:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1337</guid>
		<description>At one point, I wrote a long paper comparing Wittgenstein &amp; Weber in terms of the usefulness of either for doing social science. (It was a kind of prelude to my dissertation, actually.) Where Weber kind of (. . . fails is kind of strong, but we&#039;ll go with lower-case) fails is that he wants to cling to Objectivity, because he can&#039;t see a way around that and still have something strong enough to which he can cling, which is what Carl is alluding to, I think. LW, on the other hand, took that project to its logical conclusions, and then recognized that it was a flawed--and unnecessary--project.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At one point, I wrote a long paper comparing Wittgenstein &amp; Weber in terms of the usefulness of either for doing social science. (It was a kind of prelude to my dissertation, actually.) Where Weber kind of (. . . fails is kind of strong, but we&#8217;ll go with lower-case) fails is that he wants to cling to Objectivity, because he can&#8217;t see a way around that and still have something strong enough to which he can cling, which is what Carl is alluding to, I think. LW, on the other hand, took that project to its logical conclusions, and then recognized that it was a flawed&#8211;and unnecessary&#8211;project.</p>
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		<title>By: Carl</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1336</link>
		<dc:creator>Carl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2009 15:32:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1336</guid>
		<description>Thanks Narya, that&#039;s right on.

Dave, I read Weber as the kind of modern who fed directly into the postmodern. For him the failure of coherence was something of an existential crisis rather than the occasion for irony and play it later became. On the one hand he was deeply steeped and emotionally invested in the old metanarratives of reason, virtue and nation; on the other hand he saw clearly how local, contingent and arbitrary those constructs are. What I like about Weber and his generation is that they stare full into that abyss and still think it&#039;s worth trying to pull some stuff together, trying to reconstruct a sense of the good from scratch. That&#039;s where the communication comes back in, as we pragmatically negotiate our categories and boundaries to find ways of living together that we can value. In fact, as it turns out this is what we&#039;ve been doing all along, as John&#039;s references show.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks Narya, that&#8217;s right on.</p>
<p>Dave, I read Weber as the kind of modern who fed directly into the postmodern. For him the failure of coherence was something of an existential crisis rather than the occasion for irony and play it later became. On the one hand he was deeply steeped and emotionally invested in the old metanarratives of reason, virtue and nation; on the other hand he saw clearly how local, contingent and arbitrary those constructs are. What I like about Weber and his generation is that they stare full into that abyss and still think it&#8217;s worth trying to pull some stuff together, trying to reconstruct a sense of the good from scratch. That&#8217;s where the communication comes back in, as we pragmatically negotiate our categories and boundaries to find ways of living together that we can value. In fact, as it turns out this is what we&#8217;ve been doing all along, as John&#8217;s references show.</p>
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		<title>By: John McCreery</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1334</link>
		<dc:creator>John McCreery</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2009 04:58:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1334</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;without background categories it seems hard to identify particulars in the foreground&lt;/blockquote&gt;

That said, isn&#039;t the thrust of, for example, Charles Taylor&#039;s &lt;i&gt;Sources of the Self&lt;/i&gt; or Michel Foucault&#039;s &lt;i&gt;The Order of Things&lt;/i&gt; a warning that those background categories are subject to change?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>without background categories it seems hard to identify particulars in the foreground</p></blockquote>
<p>That said, isn&#8217;t the thrust of, for example, Charles Taylor&#8217;s <i>Sources of the Self</i> or Michel Foucault&#8217;s <i>The Order of Things</i> a warning that those background categories are subject to change?</p>
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		<title>By: Dave Mazella</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1333</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave Mazella</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2009 02:38:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1333</guid>
		<description>Carl, when I reread your original post and comments, I realized that I&#039;ve been aligning the categorical with the general, and opposing it to the local and the particular, but you&#039;re right to suggest that without background categories it seems hard to identify particulars in the foreground.  I think I was trying to make a similar point myself, but Narya&#039;s Wittgenstein quote does it far more elegantly, with the formulation of &quot;boundaries for a purpose,&quot; the forms of language that allow us both to use certain kinds of language for the purposes of communication, but also question their precise boundaries.  Your notion of local coherences that may (or may not) open out to further relationality also seems right to me.  I don&#039;t know the Strong text or the larger argument he&#039;s trying to make, but it seems difficult to square the Weberean &quot;refusal of coherence&quot; with the Wittgensteinian notion of &quot;boundaries&quot; described by Narya.  One scenario seems to leave out the communicative dimension that the other stresses.  Or am I missing something?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carl, when I reread your original post and comments, I realized that I&#8217;ve been aligning the categorical with the general, and opposing it to the local and the particular, but you&#8217;re right to suggest that without background categories it seems hard to identify particulars in the foreground.  I think I was trying to make a similar point myself, but Narya&#8217;s Wittgenstein quote does it far more elegantly, with the formulation of &#8220;boundaries for a purpose,&#8221; the forms of language that allow us both to use certain kinds of language for the purposes of communication, but also question their precise boundaries.  Your notion of local coherences that may (or may not) open out to further relationality also seems right to me.  I don&#8217;t know the Strong text or the larger argument he&#8217;s trying to make, but it seems difficult to square the Weberean &#8220;refusal of coherence&#8221; with the Wittgensteinian notion of &#8220;boundaries&#8221; described by Narya.  One scenario seems to leave out the communicative dimension that the other stresses.  Or am I missing something?</p>
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		<title>By: Narya</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1332</link>
		<dc:creator>Narya</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2009 21:04:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1332</guid>
		<description>Actually, the Wittgenstein notion that is most helpful here is the one of &quot;boundaries for a purpose.&quot; And, hell, I&#039;ll throw in language games, too, while I&#039;m at it. Carl, you got close to it on the question of bark and food; one might similarly consider whether cows are sacred or food.

What &quot;we&quot; need to do, perhaps, is acknowledge that we must use boundaries/categories/words to communicate at all, while at least occasionally questioning the categories and what we (think we) know about them.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Actually, the Wittgenstein notion that is most helpful here is the one of &#8220;boundaries for a purpose.&#8221; And, hell, I&#8217;ll throw in language games, too, while I&#8217;m at it. Carl, you got close to it on the question of bark and food; one might similarly consider whether cows are sacred or food.</p>
<p>What &#8220;we&#8221; need to do, perhaps, is acknowledge that we must use boundaries/categories/words to communicate at all, while at least occasionally questioning the categories and what we (think we) know about them.</p>
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		<title>By: Carl</title>
		<link>http://carldyke.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/eureka/#comment-1330</link>
		<dc:creator>Carl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2009 19:09:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://carldyke.wordpress.com/?p=1019#comment-1330</guid>
		<description>Dave, this looks like a great question, along the lines of Wittgenstein&#039;s &#039;private language&#039; problem, but I&#039;m not quite tracking why you think Strong is endorsing a radical particularism. Just as a general gesture, what I think is that local coherences from cellular functions to literary genres are constructed, negotiated, adopted, enforced etc. out of a whole series of relations; and although there are some characteristic ways that tends to happen, the details must always be discovered case by case. These are particular in their participants and conventions, but may or may not be radically so depending on how open to further relationality they are.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dave, this looks like a great question, along the lines of Wittgenstein&#8217;s &#8216;private language&#8217; problem, but I&#8217;m not quite tracking why you think Strong is endorsing a radical particularism. Just as a general gesture, what I think is that local coherences from cellular functions to literary genres are constructed, negotiated, adopted, enforced etc. out of a whole series of relations; and although there are some characteristic ways that tends to happen, the details must always be discovered case by case. These are particular in their participants and conventions, but may or may not be radically so depending on how open to further relationality they are.</p>
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